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THE PROPER FORMULATION OF THE MINIMALIST
THEORY OF TRUTH
By Thomas Schindler1 and Julian J. Schlöder2
Minimalism about truth is one of the main contenders for our best theory of truth, but minimalists face
the charge of being unable to properly state their theory. Donald Davidson incisively pointed out that
minimalists must generalize over occurrences of the same expression placed in two different contexts,
which is futile. In order to meet the challenge, Paul Horwich argues that one can nevertheless characterize
the axioms of the minimalist theory. Sten Lindström and Tim Button have independently argued that
Horwich’s attempt to formulate minimalism remains unsuccessful. We show how to properly state
Horwich’s axioms by appealing to propositional functions that are given by definite descriptions. Both
Lindström and Button discuss proposals similar to ours and conclude that they are unsuccessful. Our
new suggestion avoids these objections.
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I. THE MINIMALIST THEORY OF TRUTH
Minimalists about truth claim that the following is all there is to say about
what it means for the proposition that snow is white to be true.
(1) The proposition that snow is white is true iff snow is white.
The theory of truth, the minimalist continues, should be some suitable gen-
eralisation of (1). It should say about what it means for any given proposition
to be true what (1) says that it means for the proposition that snow is white to
be true. Donald Davidson (1996: 272–4) argues that it is unclear what such a
generalisation would be since ‘the same sentence appears twice in [(1)], once
after the words “the proposition that”, in a context that requires the result to be
a singular term, the subject of a predicate, and once as an ordinary sentence.’
But if no such generalisation can be found, minimalism about truth cannot be
stated, which is ‘reason enough to reject’ it (also see Blackburn and Simmons
1999).
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As a first attempt, one may try to state the theory schematically by saying
that its axioms are all sentences obtained by replacing the letter ‘p’ in (2) by a
declarative sentence of English.1
(2) The proposition that p is true iff p.
Although it is often presented in this way, this is not (and cannot be) the
minimalist’s official theory of truth. There are more propositions than can
be expressed by sentences of present-day English. But a theory of truth must
explain what it means for any proposition to be true (Horwich 1998b: 20).
The schema (2) is, at best, an incomplete theory of truth. However, as we
will rehearse in Section II, certain key arguments of the minimalist crucially
depend on the availability of a complete theory of truth.
Neither can the minimalist express her theory by (3).
(3) For all propositions x, x is true iff x.
This involves quantification into sentence position: on the right-hand side of the
biconditional in (3), the bound variable ‘x’ occurs in the syntactic position
of a sentence. But, at least in a typical first-order language, bound variables
can only occur as arguments of predicates (i.e., in object position). So (3) is ill-
formed. Whether natural language permits quantification into sentence position
is controversial (Künne 2003: ch. 2 and 6; Williamson 2013: ch. 5). However,
even if natural language permits some kinds of sentential quantification, it
seems safe to say that there is no way of expressing (3) in natural language.
To be sure, the minimalist could invent an artificial language that permits
quantification into sentence position. But this would only undermine her own
project. For she claims that the purpose of the truth predicate ‘is true’ is to
allow the expression of generalisations like (4).
(4) Everything the pope says is true.
If one could quantify into sentence position in the way required to state (3),
one could formalize (4) without using a truth predicate as (5).
(5) ∀α, if the pope says α, then α.
The whole point of minimalism is that we have a need to express sentences
like (4) and our languages have come to contain a truth predicate to meet this
need. As seen in (5), sentential quantifiers would also serve this purpose, but
in that case there would be required a battery of extra syntactic and semantic rules to
govern the new type of quantifier. Therefore, we might consider the value of our concept
1 Something also needs to be said about the Liar paradox, e.g. that not all schematic substi-
tutions for ‘p’ in (2) amount to an axiom (Horwich 1998b: 40ff) or that the Liar is not disastrous
in the background logic (e.g. Field 2008). Although this is an important issue, it is tangential to
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of truth to be that it provides, not the only way, but a relatively ‘cheap’ way of obtaining
the problematic generalizations—the way actually chosen in natural language. (Horwich
1998b: 124–5)
As Picollo and Schindler (2018) have argued in a recent paper, the function that
minimalism (or other akin forms of deflationism) ascribe to the truth predicate
is best understood as a means to simulate higher-order quantification in a first-
order framework, i.e., in a framework that allows quantification into object
position only. Thus, if the minimalist were to allow quantifiers that can bind
variables in sentence position, she would obviate her own reason for being a
minimalist. Minimalists cannot phrase their theory as in (3).
The minimalist’s woes result from the fact that she needs to generalize over
‘snow is white’ in (1), but ‘snow is white’ occurs in (1) once in sentence position
and once in object position. As pointed out by Donald Davidson (1996), there is
no adequate way to generalize over both occurrences simultaneously. But if the
minimalist cannot phrase her theory as (3), what else can she do? Minimalists
like Paul Horwich (1998b) bite the bullet and conclude that the minimalist
theory (MT) cannot be phrased. However, Horwich continues, it is possible
to characterise the axioms of MT, which is sufficient. The minimalist can find
a function E whose range (i.e., the collection of its outputs) comprises exactly
the axioms of MT. Then the axioms of MT can be characterised as follows:
(6) x is an axiom of MT iff there is a y such that y is a proposition and
x = E(y).
For instance, E maps the proposition that snow is white to the proposition
expressed by (1). Notice that Horwich does not only take propositions rather
than sentences as truth bearers, he also takes theories to be collections of
propositions rather than sentences. Hence, E is a function from propositions
to propositions. The minimalist’s task is to state the function E in a way that
avoids the issues that prevented her to state her theory outright.
This task is not trivial. Horwich’s own attempt to define E makes use of
a certain piece of notation, the angle bracket. Lindström (2001) and Button
(2014) have independently argued that Horwich’s attempt to define E fails
due to confusions surrounding this notation. We explain these arguments in
Section II. In Section III, we discuss two ways to characterize MT without the
angle bracket, one based on possible worlds semantics and one suggested by
Lindström. Unfortunately, these formulations are of little use for the minimalist
(as Lindström readily admits) because they presuppose a prior concept of truth.
In Section IV, we provide a formulation of MT that avoids the defects of
previous attempts. Button anticipated a strategy similar to ours and has reason
to believe it is futile. However, we will show in Section V that his argument is
unsuccessful. We conclude in Section VI that the minimalist is able to phrase
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II. HORWICH’S FORMULATION
Horwich’s attempt to characterize MT makes use of a piece of notation that,
when surrounding a sentence, produces a singular term denoting the proposi-
tion expressed by the sentence. Typically, this is written as angle brackets: the
singular term ‘〈snow is white〉’ denotes the proposition expressed by the sentence
‘snow is white’ (Horwich 1998b: 18, fn. 3). That is, 〈snow is white〉 is the propo-
sition that snow is white. One may hence think of angle brackets as the formal
analogue to the word ‘that’, as the expression ‘that snow is white’ denotes the
proposition expressed by ‘snow is white’.2
With this notation, we can easily state some individual axioms of MT.
For example, the expression in (7) denotes the proposition expressed by the
sentence in (1).
(7) 〈〈snow is white〉 is true ↔ snow is white〉
Having conceded that it is impossible to state all the axioms of MT explicitly,
Horwich’s goal is to find the function that maps a proposition to the corre-
sponding axiom of MT, e.g. it should map 〈snow is white〉 to (7). (Again, note
that Horwich considers theories to be collections of propositions.)
To find this function, Horwich (1998b: 17–20) avails himself of the angle
bracket. He defines the axioms of MT to be all the propositions whose structure
is
(E∗) 〈〈p〉 is true iff p〉.
Now, continues Horwich, ‘when applied to any proposition y, this structure
(or function)’ yields an axiom of the minimal theory. That is, Horwich char-
acterises the axioms of MT as follows.
(8) x is an axiom of MT iff there is a y such that y is a proposition and x =
E∗(y).
But this is confused, as has been pointed out independently by Lindström
(2001) and Button (2014). The variable ‘y’ is bound by a quantifier, so it must be
a singular term. But E∗ cannot be applied to singular terms for propositions;
if ‘y’ is a singular term, ‘〈〈y〉 is true iff y〉’ is ill-formed. To see this, replace the
variable ‘y’ by another term denoting a proposition, say ‘〈snow is white〉’. The
result is
(9) 〈〈〈snow is white〉〉 is true iff 〈snow is white〉〉.
On the left-hand side of the biconditional, angle brackets surround a name for
a proposition (i.e., a singular term), but they were explained as surrounding
2 Whether the word ‘that’ actually functions as a term forming operator in natural language
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sentences; and on its right-hand side, the singular term ‘〈snow is white〉’ occurs
in sentence position. Either results in ill-formedness.
The only coherent interpretation of (E∗) is as it being a schema: if we substitute
an English sentence for the letter ‘p’ in (E∗), the result is an expression that
denotes a proposition. But the set of instances of (E∗) is not an adequate theory
of truth, for this theory would be incomplete.
A theory of truth should apply even to propositions we cannot (yet) express
by a sentence. For example, given any real number x, there is the proposition
that x is a real number. So there are uncountably many propositions, whereas
there can only ever be countably many sentences in a (natural) language. But
for a proposition that cannot be expressed by a sentence, there evidently is no
sentence one could substitute for ‘p’ in (E∗) to obtain an axiom that states what
it means for that proposition to be true. So MT of truth cannot be stated by
defining its axioms as a schema on sentences, since this would amount to an
incomplete theory.
It would be a non-starter to say that one substitutes open formulae (sentences
with free variables, e.g. ‘x is a real number’) in (E∗) and considers all propositions
schematically formed by instantiating free variables. We might believe that
there is a true proposition d describing the composition of dark matter. This
is an intelligible use of the concept of truth and so the minimalist should
admit into her theory an axiom that explains what it is to predicate truth on
d. But d might involve yet undeveloped concepts, so it is not an instance of a
presently expressible open formula.3 Considering this proposition d in more
detail further elucidates the dilemma the minimalist is in. The minimalist may
want to say that (10) is an axiom of MT.
(10) 〈T(〈d〉) ↔ d〉.
But ‘d’ is a singular term, so ‘〈d〉’ is ill-formed. This was the problem with
Horwich’s function E∗. It is equally hopeless to write (11).
(11) 〈T(d) ↔ d〉.
Here, ‘T(d)’ is well-formed, but the whole biconditional is not, as the singular
term ‘d’ appears in sentence position on its right-hand side.
Finally, for the sake of argument, suppose that {.} is a sort of inverse of 〈.〉.
That is, {.} takes a singular term for a proposition and produces a sentence
3 Horwich (1998b: 18, fn. 3) suggests that, in case his theory (8) does not pan out, one should
use all instances of (E∗) for sentences in possible extensions of English. Conceivably, there is a possible
extension of English that comes with the concepts needed to describe dark matter; and for every
real number r, one can imagine an extension of English that has a name for r. So this definition
has the potential to result in a complete theory of truth, but it seems that it commits us to there
being uncountably many possible extensions of English. Button thinks this is hopeless. We are
more optimistic about Horwich’s prospects here, but as we go on below to phrase a proper
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expressing that proposition. We might be tempted to claim that (12) is an axiom
of MT.
(12) 〈T(d) ↔ {d}〉.
But this is ill-formed because {d} does not (presently) exist. The curly brackets
are supposed to map a proposition to a sentence expressing it. But there is
(presently) no sentence that expresses d.4 This was the problem with reading
Horwich’s E∗ as a schema.
The minimalist appears to be out of options. In the axiom stating what it
means to predicate truth on d, ‘d’ occurs once as being subject to a predicate
and once as being equivalent to a proposition. These distinct uses of ‘d’ cannot
be equivocated, so the minimalist must somehow make this distinction. Davidson
(1996: 274) does ‘not see how this can be done’ and we have just seen that the
angle brackets are of no help (see Button (2014) and Lindström (2001) for
further discussion on the angle bracket).
Before we move on, let us be clear why the minimalist needs a complete theory
of truth in the first place. For, one might wonder, wouldn’t it be sufficient to
consider (E∗) as an open-ended schema? The problem, as Button (2014: 285–
6) observes, is that certain key arguments of the minimalist crucially rely on
the availability of a complete theory of truth. For example, consider how the
minimalist typically explains general facts about truth like ‘true beliefs facilitate
success’. Very roughly, start by considering the proposition that snow is white.
The idea is that we can observe that if snow is white, then believing that snow
is white facilitates success. Using MT, it follows that if it is true that snow is
white, then believing that snow is white facilitates success. We can do this for
any other proposition as well, so to derive the general claim that true beliefs
facilitate success, we merely ‘need to collect all these conclusions together’
(Horwich 1998b: 137).5 If MT were not complete, then this strategy would
only show the value of some true beliefs (namely, about propositions covered by
MT). But the minimalist claims to have explained the value of true belief tout
court. To maintain this claim, she needs to present a complete theory.
III. FORMULATIONS PRESUPPOSING TRUTH
Horwich’s attempt to characterize the axioms of MT is unsuccessful. The
angle brackets are of little help because they can only be used to form terms
4 Again, one might consider that {.} maps a proposition to a sentence in a possible extension
of English that expresses d (according to the semantics of this possible extension of English). See
the previous footnote.
5 There are some well-known criticisms of this strategy (e.g. Gupta 1993; Raatikainen 2005).
We set this aside here, as the matter at hand is whether the minimalist can get her own arguments
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for propositions that are expressible in the actual language. Of course, this
does not mean that MT cannot be phrased at all.
If, for example, the minimalist makes use of a sufficiently powerful concep-
tion of propositions, she is able to describe the axioms of her theory. Many
conceive of propositions as sets of possible worlds. Given this conception, we
can characterize the axioms of MT as follows (where Tr is the function that
sends a proposition x to the proposition that x is true).
(13) x is an axiom of MT iff there is a proposition y such that for all worlds
w : w ∈ x iff (w ∈ y iff w ∈ Tr(y)).
That is, x is an axiom of MT when there is a proposition y such that x contains
exactly those worlds in which y is equivalent to the proposition that y is true.
Accepting all axioms of MT would then leave one with all and only those
worlds in which all propositions are equivalent to their own truth, which is as
desired.
But this gives no succor to the minimalist. If she conceives of propositions as
sets of possible worlds, she has taken on certain metaphysical commitments that
include an understanding of a proposition’s truth conditions and what it means for
a proposition to be true at a world. The minimalist cannot, of course, buttress
her theory of truth on a theory of propositions with substantial commitments
about what it means for propositions to be true. It is for that reason that
Horwich (1998b) searches for an alternative conception of propositions. (He
endorses a use-based theory of propositions, whose details are tangential to
the matter at hand.)
A more sophisticated attempt along similar lines is developed by Lindström
(2001). He assumes that there is a class P of all propositions whatsoever, be
they expressible or not. He further assumes that there is a subclass T of P that
contains all and only the true propositions. On the class T, we can define the
Boolean operations by their usual recursive definitions. For example, we may
stipulate that disjunction (+) and negation (−) satisfy the following laws.
(14) x + y ∈ T iff x ∈ T or y ∈ T.
(15) −x ∈ T iff x 	∈T.
Following the same idea, we can also define the truth predicate and the material
biconditional.
(16) Tr(x) ∈ T iff x ∈ T.
(17) x ⇔ y ∈ T iff (x ∈ T iff y ∈ T).
From (16) and (17), we immediately obtain, for all propositions x ∈ P.
(18) (Tr(x)⇔x) ∈ T.
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(19) A proposition y is an axiom of MT iff there is an x ∈ P such that y =
(Tr(x)⇔x).
However, definition (19) cannot satisfy the minimalist, as Lindström readily
admits (Lindström 2001: 171). The problem is that the minimalist has helped
herself to a substantive prior understanding of truth when defining the Boolean
operations by recursion on the set of true propositions. It is important to be
precise here. The problem of Lindström’s approach is not that it assumes the
(mere) existence of the class T or the existence of the predicate Tr. The mini-
malist assumes that these exist and aims to state their proper theory. Rather,
the problem is that the characterisation of the axioms of MT, (19), presup-
poses that the class of true propositions, T, satisfies some very specific laws,
viz (14)–(17). For instance, the last clause, (17), stipulates that a biconditional
proposition x ⇔ y belongs to the class of true propositions iff x belongs to it
exactly when y belongs to it. This is naturally interpreted in one of two ways.
Either as expressing a truth-theoretic law (i.e., that the set of true propositions
is closed under biconditionalising two members and under biconditionalising
two non-members) or as a clause fixing the meaning of the biconditional (à la
Davidson). Both readings are problematic. If (14) is read as a truth-theoretic
law, then one should expect it to follow from the minimalist’s theory of truth,
rather than being required for phrasing it. If it is a clause intended to fix the
meaning of the biconditional, then the meaning of the biconditional depends
on a prior conception of truth. This cannot be the minimal theory (19). Since
(19) depends on (17), one cannot have (17) depend on (19) on pain of circularity.6
IV. THE PROPER FORMULATION
Lindström’s attempt to state MT gestures at the right direction: we need to
characterize the axioms of MT in terms of our prior understanding of the
Boolean connectives. But we must not characterize these connectives by their
usual recursive definitions, or algebraically in terms of the class of all true
proposition. We will now show how to do so in a way that is germane to the
minimalist’s needs.
As a warm-up, consider the function NOT that maps a proposition to
the proposition that is its negation. For propositions that can be expressed by
sentences, we can state NOT explicitly by using the angle brackets.
(20) NOT(〈p 〉) = 〈¬ p〉.
Again, this is a schema where the letter ‘p’ is not a singular term, but a placeholder
for a declarative sentence of English.
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Now, we contend that it is possible to apply the function NOT to propo-
sitions that cannot (yet) be expressed. That is, given some proposition x that
is currently not expressible by some declarative sentence of English, we can
refer to its negation by using the expression ‘NOT(x )’. Indeed, when we have
a proposition, we can always talk about its negation without making anything
further explicit. Making this thought more formal, we may define the function
NOT for arbitrary propositions by a definite description.
(21) NOT(x ) =Df the proposition that is the negation of x.
Using this definite description to refer to negations of potentially inexpressible
propositions is in line with typical minimalist commitments about language
and propositions. Suppose we are working with a use-theory of meaning and
propositions, favoured by Horwich (1998a). From being acquainted with the
use of the word ‘not’ in a range of sentences, we are acquainted with many
instances of the principle in (20). From this acquaintance, a use-theorist would
maintain, we come to open-endedly accept a rule by generalisation.
Open-endedness is an assumption about how we accept and apply certain
rules. For example, logicians typically consider our acceptance of inference
rules to be open-ended. Here’s Vann McGee:
Our acceptance of the classical rules of inference surely is open-ended. . . . When we
introduce a new predicate into the language—say, when we discover a new species or
introduce a new product line—we do not have to inquire whether [a rule] remains valid
for inferences involving the new predicate. (McGee 2000: 66)
That is, accepting the inferential relations between propositions is not ac-
cepting something about any particular class of propositions expressible in
a particular language, but about propositions tout court. Forming negations is
open-ended in this sense. Our acceptance of the rule to form negations does
not rest on empirical knowledge about some subset of the propositions we are
acquainted with or which we can phrase. It is accepting a rule about propo-
sitions tout court. This rule in particular allows us to apply ‘NOT’ to singular
terms, including variables ‘y’ bound by a quantifier ‘∃y’ that ranges over pos-
sibly inexpressible propositions. This is analogous to our ability to learn the
addition function and apply it to refer to the sum of numbers that we have not
encountered before. If ‘x’ and ‘y’ are singular terms for real numbers, we can
talk about the sum of x and y without actually computing it. Likewise, if ‘x’ is
a singular term for a proposition, we can talk about the negation of x without
actually taking a sentence expressing x and inserting ‘not’.
All this is just to say that we accept rules about things whose total or potential
extents we cannot survey and indeed do not need to survey. This, arguably,
includes logical rules, mathematical operations—and negating propositions.
The open-ended nature of our acceptance of these rules is distinct from the
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that this is done by generalisation. The question of how such generalisation
works is of course a gnarly one (Kripke 1982) and one we cannot answer here.
There are other possible stories—e.g. that some rules are a priori (Wedgwood
1999)—that face similarly gnarly questions. In any case, we take it to be largely
uncontroversial that one can talk about propositions tout court by using singular
terms and then also talk about their negations.
We cannot, however, state NOT(x ) in functional terms for propositions x that
are not expressible by a sentence. That is, we cannot complete the equation
‘NOT(x ) = ...’ like we could state (20).7 The angle brackets allow us to state
schematic equations like (20), but such equations are not needed to talk about
the proposition that is the negation of some proposition (that may or may not
be expressed by a sentence).
Now, we can similarly consider for each predicate F the function that maps
a first-order object x to the proposition that x is F. For example, since ‘is green’
is a predicate, we may define the function GREEN that maps an object x to
the proposition that x is green.
(22) GREEN(x ) =Df the proposition that x is green.
Note that GREEN is not the same as the predicate ‘is green’. ‘GREEN(x)’ is a
singular term for a proposition, but ‘x is green’ is a formula. Neither is GREEN
identical to the property of being green, as, again, the former is a function that
outputs propositions whereas the latter is something else, depending on one’s
theory of properties.8
Like we defined NOT, we can also define a two-place function BC that,
given two propositions x and y, returns their biconditional. And like we defined
GREEN, we can consider the function TRUE that maps a proposition x to
the proposition that x is true.9
(23) BC(x, y ) =Df the proposition that is the biconditional of x and y.
7 It would be possible to do so if we were to commit to certain theories of propositions. If,
say, propositions are sets of worlds, then NOT(y ) is the complement of y. Using a recursive,
truth-conditional definition of negation would likewise allow a definition of NOT by an explicit
equation. But neither minimalists nor ourselves want to commit to such accounts, for reasons
given in the previous section.
8 Note that we have some leeway as to the precise nature of propositions, properties, and indi-
viduals, and how they relate to each other. For instance, we have a choice as to whether ‘x’ ranges
over individuals or Fregean senses. If ‘x’ ranges over individuals, then the proposition GREEN(x )
is a singular or Russellian proposition, having the individual x itself as a constituent; if we assume
‘x’ ranges over Fregean senses, GREEN(x ) is something like a Fregean thought. Note that, at least
according to Horwich, minimalism is compatible with either type of propositions, Russellian and
Fregean ones, so we need not decide this matter here (Horwich 1998b: 91). However, as said,
Lewisian propositions as sets of possible worlds are incompatible with minimalism.
9 We contend that predicating truth on a proposition is just like predicating green on a leaf,
i.e., that propositions are first-order objects. Some might treat quantification over propositions
as, say, second-order quantification. But this permits quantification into sentence position, which
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(24) TRUE(x ) =Df the proposition that x is true.
For those propositions that can be expressed by sentences, we can use angle
brackets to make these functions explicit (again, ‘p’ and ‘q’ are schematic
placeholders for English sentences).
(25) BC(〈p 〉, 〈q〉) = 〈p ↔ q〉.
(26) TRUE(〈p 〉) = 〈〈p 〉 is true〉.
But these equations do not (and cannot) define what it means to apply BC
and TRUE to propositions that cannot be expressed by sentences. The general
definition of these functions is by definite description.
Now we can define MT. To wit:10
(27) x is an axiom of MT iff there is a y such that y is a proposition and
x = E(y), where E (y ) =Df BC(TRUE(y ), y ).
This is well-defined, since the functions TRUE and BC take proposi-
tions as their arguments and return propositions as their outputs. All oc-
currences of the singular term ‘y’ in (27) are in object position. The re-
sulting theory is complete, as for even those propositions y that cannot
be expressed by a sentence, we can refer to the corresponding axiom of
MT, E(y).
Using definite descriptions to define E allows the minimalist to make the
distinction between propositions occurring as subjects to predicates and as
being equivalent to (other) propositions. To wit, given some proposition x
we can refer to a proposition like TRUE(x ) in which x occurs as an object
and we can also refer to a proposition like BC(x, y ) in which x occurs as
being equivalent to y. This answers Davidson’s (1996) challenge about how to
generalize over both types of occurrences. The core observation is that using
definite descriptions to define E in (27) eliminates the need to put a singular
term in sentence position. This need previously arose when the minimalist
attempted to form the biconditional in E. The definition of BC, however,
describes a biconditional proposition by a description in which only singular
terms occur.
Since our E does not make use of the angle brackets and can properly be ap-
plied even to propositions not expressible by sentences, Lindström’s (2001) and
Button’s (2014) concerns are resolved as well. It might be objected at this point
that, like Lindström, we have illicitly appealed to a prior understanding of truth.
Our definition (26) of the function TRUE is given in terms of a definite descrip-
tion containing the word ‘true’. But this is not a problem. All that is required
10 With it being clear now that we can grasp arbitrary propositions formed by logical
operations and predication, we could also speak directly of the proposition obtained by ‘T-
biconditionalising’ a proposition directly. We assume, however, that in the order of explanation
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to get the function TRUE going is an understanding that ‘true’ is a predicate
that can be applied to propositions. Nothing further about the nature of truth
is presupposed by the definite description in (26). Everything regarding what
the truth predicate actually is or contributes to a proposition comes from MT.
And our definitions of the functions like BC are neither truth-theoretic laws
(as they do not involve truth at all) nor definitions of the connectives. All that is
required for these functions is an understanding of the logical connectives. This
understanding must of course not be grounded in their truth-functions, but the
use-theorist has other options, e.g. that the meaning of ‘and’ is an abstraction
of the tendency to accept ‘p and q’ if and only if one accepts both p and q
(Horwich 1998a: 45).
That is, our formulation of MT rests on the following assumptions. We
(i) have an understanding of the logical connectives that does not involve
truth and (ii) this understanding includes the open-ended ability to negate
propositions, biconditionalize them etc. Both are provided by a use-theory like
the one suggested by Horwich.
While the angle brackets were not useful to state E, we can find them
precisely where they make sense. Suppose a proposition y is expressible
by some sentence, e.g. y is 〈snow is white〉. Then we can compute E(y) as
follows:
E (y ) = E (〈snow is white〉) = BC(TRUE(〈snow is white〉), 〈snow is white〉)
= BC(〈〈snow is white〉 is true〉, 〈snow is white〉)
= 〈〈snow is white〉 is true ↔ snow is white〉.
This is exactly the desired axiom (7). So, for those propositions that are ex-
pressible by a sentence (and only those), the angle brackets can be used to
explicitly compute the functions TRUE and BC. But it would be a mistake
to use angle brackets to define these functions in general. The same goes for
E. For expressible propositions (and only those), E can be explicitly written
in angle brackets, but its general definition is as in (27). This, we submit, is the
proper formulation of the minimalist theory of truth.
V. IS THE PROPER FORMULATION SELF-UNDERMINING?
Button (2014), in his discussion of the minimalist’s problem with the angle
brackets, anticipated something akin to our response. He claims that the
minimalist who makes use of functions like BC to phrase E as in (27) has
again undermined herself by implicitly endorsing quantification into sentence
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also endorse a corresponding function for universal quantification, ALL. He
defines it as follows (p. 279, with notation slightly adjusted by us):
(28) when F is a predicate and hF is a one-place function mapping any x
to the proposition that x is F, ALL(h F ) is the proposition that predicates F
of everything.
Now, in addition to the function BC that forms biconditionals, we can consider
the function C that forms material conditionals.
(29) C(x, y ) =Df , the proposition that is the conditional with antecedent x
and consequent y.
With this, Button continues, we have everything we need to refer to the propo-
sition expressed by ‘Everything the pope says is true’, but without appealing
to the concept of truth. Here is Button’s argument, as it would go for our
formulation of MT. Consider the following one-place function POPE.
(30) POPE(x ) =Df the proposition that the pope said x.
This means there is the one-place function C(POPE(x ), x ). We use underlined
letters ‘x ’ and ‘y ’ to indicate the arguments of a function (where it matters),
distinguished from singular terms ‘x’ and ‘y’ for propositions. That is, C(x, x )
is a one-place function, C(x, y ) is a two-place function, and C(x, x ) is the
proposition returned by C(x, x ) on the input x.
Now, apply ALL to obtain the proposition ALL(C(POPE(x ), x )). Button
claims that this proposition is equivalent to the one expressed by ‘Everything
the pope says is true’. But ALL(C(POPE(x ), x )) does not involve the concept
of truth. Hence, he concludes, the minimalist has undermined herself: the
minimalist claimed that the truth predicate is needed to form universal gen-
eralisations over propositions, but to phrase her own theory has endorsed
machinery to obviate that need.
At first glance, it may seem that the minimalist has to concede the point.
She herself has claimed that one can form BC(TRUE(x ), x ), so it must be fair
to form C(POPE(x ), x ). She can hardly deny that there is a function such as
ALL, as forming universal generalisations is something that we can do just
as well as forming biconditionals and there is no reason to think that the
description in the definition of ALL does not refer. Finally, it would be a non-
starter for the minimalist to insist that the predicate ‘is true’ is not eliminable
from our language (where there is no quantification into sentence position),
while accepting Button’s demonstration that she has committed herself to
accepting that the concept of truth (or the property being true) is redundant
on the level of propositions. This would amount to a redundancy theory of
truth, not minimalism. So it appears that when using propositional functions to
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or, if the minimalist insists on the non-eliminability of ‘is true’ on the linguistic
level, collapses into the redundancy theory of truth.
The appearance is misleading. Button claims that ALL applied to the func-
tion C(POPE(x ), x ) returns a proposition equivalent to everything the pope says
is true. To see that it does not, first consider a simpler case. What do we get
when we apply ALL to the function C(x, x )? If Button is right, we should
get a proposition equivalent to the claim that all conditionals with identical
antecedent and consequent are true. But this is not the case, as ALL cannot
be applied to C(x, x ) at all! The function C(x, x ) is not a one-place function
that maps each x to a proposition that predicates something of x. Let x be any
proposition. C(x, x ) does not predicate anything of x because x does not occur
in object position (i.e., under a predicate). So one cannot apply ALL to it.
To see this, consider a concrete proposition, like 〈snow is white〉 or 〈siw〉
for short. When talking about such concrete propositions that are expressed
by sentences, we can make the result of applying C explicit. To wit (again, the
letters ‘p’ and ‘q’ are schematic placeholders for sentences):
(31) C(〈p 〉, 〈q〉) = 〈 p → q〉.
So we can compute that C(〈siw〉, 〈siw〉) is 〈siw → siw〉. This is not a proposition
where 〈siw〉 is in object position. Nothing is predicated on 〈siw〉.
Now turn to Button’s application of ALL. Like above for C, we can make
POPE explicit for concrete propositions like 〈siw〉.
(32) POPE(〈p 〉) = 〈pope-says(〈p 〉)〉.
Now compute:
(33) C(POPE(〈siw〉), 〈siw〉) = 〈pope-says(〈siw〉) → siw〉.
This does predicate something on 〈siw〉. We can find the predicate F by
substituting a free variable ‘y’ for ‘〈siw〉’ in the right-hand side of (33). The
result is this:
(F) pope-says(y) → siw.
There remains an occurrence of ‘siw’ because this occurrence is in sentence
position. When we apply a substitution to find the predicate F, we only substi-
tute ‘y’ for the singular term ‘〈siw〉’, but not for the sentence ‘siw’. Although
we have a predicate, applying ALL to C(POPE(x ), x ) is impossible. The conse-
quent of F depends on the particular input 〈siw〉. So what is predicated varies
with the input. C(POPE(〈siw〉), 〈siw〉) predicates F on 〈siw〉. But, writing ‘wiw’
for ‘water is wet’, C(POPE(〈wiw〉), 〈wiw〉) predicates F* on 〈wiw〉.
(F*)pope-says(y) → wiw
Thus, there is no determinate predicate F such that C(POPE(x ), x ) is a function
that maps a proposition x to the proposition that x is F. Different x give different
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The problem is subtle, vexing—and familiar. In the proposition
C(POPE(〈siw〉), 〈siw〉) (i.e., 〈If the pope said 〈siw〉, then siw〉), the expres-
sion ‘siw’ occurs once in sentence position and once as part of an expression
that is in object position: ‘〈siw〉’. Button’s plan is to apply ALL to general-
ize over both occurrences of ‘siw’. But this is illicit, as the two occurrences
are in different syntactic positions and so cannot be generalised in the same
variable. This was Davidson’s observation: one cannot generalize a variable
in sentence and object positions. To universally generalise, we must ensure
that what we generalize over is always in object position. For example, we
obtain the proposition that everything the pope says is true by applying ALL
to C(POPE(x ), TRUE(x )).
This is what the minimalist claimed all along. And she already conceded that
she is unable to state a universal generalisation over all outputs of functions like
C(POPE(x ), x ). The minimalist’s problem with generalising over her function
E (x ) was that in the output of E for any x, x appears both in object and in
sentence position. Button’s argument shows that the minimalist must accept
that she is unable to form such universal generalisations over propositional
functions, if her theory is not to collapse into redundancy. This is why she was
forced to state her theory as an infinite collection of axioms instead of a single
universal statement.
But minimalism is not yet out of the woods. Yes, one may intervene on
Button’s behalf, the function ALL applied to C(POPE(x ), x ) does not allow
the generalisation that Button had in mind and so does not lead to truth being
redundant. But this may merely be a problem with the particular function ALL.
There could be another function ALL′ that when applied to C(POPE(x ), x )
yields a proposition equivalent to the one expressed by ‘everything the pope
says is true’. Indeed there is. It can be defined as (34).
(34) ALL′(h ) =Df , the proposition that for all propositions y, h(y) is true.
But ALL′ uses the truth predicate, so truth is not eliminated when we form
ALL′(C(POPE(x ), x )).
No variant of ALL will make make truth redundant. Taking a step back
from the specifics of how one forms universal generalisations, Button’s core
idea is that the following two functions are not all that different. They both
map a proposition to another one.
(35) h 1( y ) =Df C(POPE( y ), y ).
(36) h 2( y ) =Df C(POPE( y ), TRUE( y )).
Either function applied to, say, the proposition that snow is white outputs a
proposition equivalent to the one expressed by ‘if the pope said that snow is
white, then snow is white’. The sole difference between h1 and h2 is that h1
does not mention a truth predicate.
Everyone agrees that one can universally generalize over the outputs of h2
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it is that one forms this generalisation, it seems surprising that one cannot do
the same for h1 to form a proposition stating that everything the pope says is
true, but without involving a truth predicate. Why should one not be able to
take any function mapping a proposition to another and form an universal
generalisation over, roughly put, all its outputs?
The minimalist insists that this is indeed just roughly put. Once one properly
unpacks the idea of generalising over ‘the outputs’ of a propositional function,
the truth predicate will be revealed to not be redundant; in fact, its central
role in quantifying over propositions will be highlighted. Certainly it is possible
to universally generalize over all outputs of a propositional function, but the
only precise way to do so is to say that all the function’s outputs are true.
This is our function ALL′. It is also possible to universally generalize over a
predication function. This is Button’s function ALL. Both functions are useful
and represent important parts of our conceptual vocabulary, but neither makes
truth redundant. No good alternatives are forthcoming.
Perhaps one can insist that there just is a generalisation function that when
applied to h1 returns, roughly put, the universal generalisation over all outputs
of h1. It might not be possible to define this function without involving the truth
predicate or even to non-roughly explain what this function does without using
the word ‘true’. But such a function may nevertheless exist and thereby cause
trouble for the minimalist who states her theory using proposition-forming
functions. Such a move would need to be supplemented with at least some
argument as to why the minimalist should concede the existence of such a
generalisation function. And any such argument would likely be question
begging.
It was always clear that if the truth property is eliminable on the propo-
sitional level (even if the predicate ‘is true’ is not eliminable from language),
minimalism collapses into the redundancy theory of truth. If the required uses
of ‘is true’ in language are not replicated on the propositional level, then our
function TRUE is just identity, mapping any proposition to itself. But mini-
malists assume that propositions are the primary truth bearers and that the
truth property is not redundant (albeit deflationary) on the propositional level
as well. That is, say, the sentences ‘snow is white’ and ‘〈snow is white〉 is true’
have different meanings, i.e., express the distinct propositions 〈snow is white〉
and TRUE(〈snow is white〉), respectively. If TRUE is identity, these proposi-
tions are identical and minimalism collapses into redundancy—the MT would
just be the set of trivial biconditionals BC(y , y ). Appealing to a generalisation
function to establish this is just a detour.
To be sure, one can eliminate truth by appealing to certain other predicates.
Consider the following.
(37) ME(x, y ) =Df , the proposition that x materially entails y.
Applying ALL to the function ME(POPE(x ), x ) outputs a proposition equiva-
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not surprising or troubling to the minimalist that one can eliminate truth by
helping oneself to the property of material entailment.
The material entailment predicate is interdefinable with the truth predicate.
Instead of saying that some proposition is true, we can say that it is materially
entailed by some logical truth; and instead of saying that some proposition
materially entails another, we can say that either the first is not true or the
second is true. So both the truth predicate and the material entailment pred-
icate can be used to fulfill the same needs.11 Button’s challenge was that if
truth is eliminable, minimalism is undermined. The undermining challenge
seemed troubling because minimalists claim that the truth predicate is needed
for certain purposes and by eliminating truth one shows that it is not. But to
show that truth is eliminable by introducing another device to meet that need
does not undermine anything. Eliminating truth by appealing to an equivalent
device for disquotation seems to only highlight the minimalist point that one
such device is needed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Davidson (1996) argued that if minimalism about truth cannot be stated prop-
erly, this is reason enough to reject it. Horwich (1998b) conceded that it might
not be possible to state the (infinitely many) axioms of MT, but it is sufficient to
characterize them by stating a function E that takes a proposition and returns
the corresponding axiom of MT. Lindström (2001) and Button (2014) indepen-
dently pointed out that Horwich’s attempt to state such an E is unsuccessful
due to his use of the angle brackets.
We argued that the function E characterising MT of truth can and indeed
should be stated without making use of the angle brackets. Instead, we sug-
gest that the minimalist appeal to propositional functions given by definite
descriptions. MT can then be characterised as follows.
(38) x is an axiom of MT iff there is a y such that y is a proposition and x =
E(y), where E (y ) = BC(TRUE(y ), y ).
Button argued that when articulated as (38), MT of truth collapses into the
redundancy theory, as the minimalist has allegedly committed herself to a
generalisation function that allows one to eliminate the truth predicate alto-
gether. However, there is no definition of such a function that does not itself
appeal to the concept of truth, so the argument succeeds only if TRUE is the
identity function on propositions. But to assume this begs the question against
the minimalist.
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For all propositions y expressible by some sentence (i.e., y = 〈p〉 where ‘p’
stands for a sentence), E(y) is indeed just 〈〈p〉 is true ↔ p〉, exactly as the min-
imalist claimed all along. But she was mistaken to then generalize over this
schema as if ‘p’ were a singular term. Instead, we have argued, she should
define E by definite description without assuming anything substantive about
the denotations of these descriptions. This, we submit, puts Davidson’s wor-
ries about generalisation, Button’s worries about notational confusions, and
Lindström’s worries about presupposing truth to rest.
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